CPU cache is limited but crucial storage on modern processor whereas the cache timing side-channel could indirectly leak data through the measurable timing variance. Speculative execution, a reason for the variance and a vital optimization in modern CPUs, can engender severe detriment to deliberate branch mispredictions. Though static analysis can qualitatively verify the timing-leakagefree property under speculative execution, it is incapable of producing endorsements including inputs and speculated flows to diagnose leaks in depth. This work proposes a new approach, Speculative symbolic Execution, for precisely validating cache timing leaks introduced by speculative execution. Generally, given a program with sensitive inputs (leakage-free in non-speculative execution), our method systematically explores the program state space. Meanwhile, it models speculative behavior at conditional branches, and accumulates the cache side effects along with subsequent execution. Based on the dynamic exploration and a specified cache model, we construct leak conditions for memory accesses, and conduct a constraint-solving based cache behavior analysis to generate leak witnesses. We have implemented our method in a tool named SpecuSym on KLEE, and evaluated it against 14 open-source benchmarks. Experiments show that SpecuSym successfully identified leaks in 6 programs on four different caches and eliminated false positives in 2 programs reported by recent work. 1
INTRODUCTION
Computer cache is a limited but crucial storage area on processor chips. It primarily relieves the speed gap between the rapid processors and the slow main memory, by buffering recently used data for faster reuse. Cache timing side-channel attacks [22, 39] leverage the distinguishable cache physical symptoms, i.e., the cache access latency in software program executions, to penetrate the confidentiality of the victim system. On exploiting the vulnerable software implementations, adversaries can extract the application secrets [13, 28, 48, 52] , infer the neural network structure [26, 32, 33, 60] , or even dump the kernel memory data [34, 38, 44, 56] .
Generally, a timing side channel presents the intermediate carrier through which private data could be disclosed to external observers by elaborate measurements of the time on certain operations. One particular instance is the cache timing side-channel that leaks data from the variance of the cache visiting latency in software executions. State-of-the-art program repair method [58] relevant operations. However, this strong mitigation may still be compromised by thread-level concurrency [30] or instruction-level parallelism like speculative execution [36] . Speculative execution [36] is a vital optimization of modern processors. Essentially, it increases the CPU instruction pipeline throughput by beforehand scheduling instructions under predicted branches, which prevents from stalling the pipeline. Despite its importance, the side effects from prediction errors to cache state may engender severe vulnerabilities through the cache timing side channel [12, 35, 38, 56] in terms of the disorganized memory accesses.
Program analysis for speculative execution is by no means a new approach. Literally, existing efforts mainly focused on safe and efficient execution [18, 27, 50] , worst case execution time [42, 43] , concurrency bug prediction [17, 41] and etc, while Wu et.al [59] recently proposed static verification of timing-leakage-free property under speculative execution. However, such abstract interpretation based method [59] qualitatively answers the yes or no question -it is incapable of generating input and the exact execution flow to endorse the leaks in depth. Moreover, over-approximation inherently incurs false positives, thus a more precise method is indispensable.
To this end, we propose a new method speculative symbolic execution, for the validation of cache timing leaks introduced by speculative execution. Figure 1 shows the overall flow of our method. Given a program P which is leakage-free under non-speculative execution, the sensitive inputs represented in symbol, and insensitive inputs, our method leverages symbolic execution to explores P's state space. In addition, it models speculative execution at conditional branches during execution (cf. 1 ) and accumulates cache side effects along with subsequent executions (cf. 2 ). Based on the memory access history and the cache model, it conducts a constraint-solving based cache behavior analysis (cf. 3 ) upon memory accesses, and output the precise leak witnesses (cf. 4 ).
Our method has three major challenges. The first challenge is from the modeling of speculative behaviors. Classic symbolic executors [14, 49] neither support speculative execution nor are cacheaware since they primarily focus on the functional correctness rather than reasoning the implicit program properties. The second challenge comes from the cache state maintenance. Due to the symbolic nature, one symbolic memory address may correspond to multiple concrete addresses. Updating the cache after each memory access can lead to an explosive number of cache states. The last challenge stems from the analysis cost. Processors may trigger multiple branch mis-predictions along a program path. Indiscriminately covering all possibilities not only introduces tremendous constraint solving overhead but also counts many redundant cases.
The first challenge motivates us to design a new modeling algorithm which satisfies both feasibility and high-fidelity in symbolic execution. In essence, it utilizes the stateful exploration to mimic the speculative behaviors and isolates memory changes in speculative states from regular symbolic states. To tackle the second challenge, we developed a lazy modeling strategy which tracks memory accesses and lazily reasons about cache effects rather than maintaining a complete cache state set. To address the last challenge, we filter the branches that are unlikely to cause harmful speculative execution. Also, we develop several optimization to shrink the constraint size for solving cost reduction.
We have implemented Speculative Symbolic Execution in a prototype named SpecuSym atop KLEE [14] and LLVM [40] . The evaluation of SpecuSym has been performed on 15 open-source programs which have 8,791 lines of C code in total. Experiments manifest SpecuSym detects from 22 to 130 leaks in 6 programs under four different set-associative caches.
To summarize, we have made the following contributions:
• We propose a new approach, Speculative Symbolic Execution, for modeling speculative execution and analyzing the affected cache behaviors in symbolic execution. • We address the aforementioned challenges and implement our new method, in a software tool SpecuSym , to detect cache timing leaks under speculative execution. • We evaluate SpecuSym on 15 open-source benchmarks to demonstrate its effectiveness through discovering from 22 to 130 leak witnesses under four different caches. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our work and section 3 reviews the background knowledge. Section 4 states our major contributions and optimizations. Next, we present our experiments in Section 5 and discuss the related work in Section 6. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 7.
MOTIVATION
In this section, we use an example to motivate our work. By studying its timing-leakage-free cache behavior in a non-speculative execution and the new leaks caused by speculative execution, we position how SpecuSym facilities leakage diagnosis. Listed at line 2, P has 4 local variables S, x, v1, and v2. Operating these variables leads to memory accesses. E.g., the implicit memory read of x (line 6) and the explicit store to v1 (line 7). The remaining variable i (line 3) is a register variable which does not incur memory access. Also, variable x is a sensitive input and any form of revealing its value turns to be a leak.
Program P and the Cache Mapping
To analyze P, we use a fully associative cache C, as shown in Figure 2 (b). It is an extreme case of the N-way associative cache where a memory address in P may map to any cache line in C, subjecting to the line availability and the replacement policy. Here we assume C uses the Least Recently Used (LRU) policy which always evicts the least used line once the cache is fully occupied.
Cache C consists of 256 cache lines and each line contains exact one byte. Local variables are inserted to C according to their sizes as well as the execution order. E.g., in Figure 2 (b) array S maps from cache lines #1 to #254 because of the array traverse in the while loop (lines 4-5) and each array item successively occupies a full line. Then variable x maps to the 255 th line. Next, v1 would use the last available line (line #256) if x is greater than 128 and the execution flow proceeds into the if branch. Otherwise, the execution takes the else branch and writes v2, mapping v2 to line #256.
Leakage-free in Non-speculative Execution
Running P without speculative execution won't leak any information about x, and we analyze why this claim holds in this section.
There are two program paths in P in terms of the if-else branch. Let's name the path containing the if branch as p 1 and the other one as p 2 . The only difference between p 1 and p 2 is the memory store operation which writes v1 on p 1 but v2 on p 2 . As analyzed in section 2.1, v1 would map to the last line of C. Similarly, without speculative execution v2 also maps to the same line, as annotated by the solid arrow in Figure 2 (b). This is because normally either p 1 or p 2 could be taken. Consequently, either the store to v1 or the store to v2 may happen. In both cases, line #256 is untouched until the store operates. Thereby, v1 or v2 takes that available line.
Relying on this fact, we observe similar cache behavior on both p 1 and p 2 under non-speculative execution. The first 254 load operations of array S, the next implicit memory read of x, and the succeeded store to v1 on p 1 or v2 on p 2 all cause cold misses since the cache is initially empty. However, the last memory load on S[x] (line 10) must be a cache hit on both paths because S and x have already been inserted in the cache C. In other words, P's cache behavior is independent of the sensitive input x hence P has no cache timing leaks under non-speculative execution. , ,
New Leak under Speculative Execution
Recall that in section 2.2 only one store operation could occur in non-speculative execution. However, the situation changes and new timing leak appears when running P with speculative execution.
Under speculative execution, the instructions guarded by a branch br can be scheduled before the execution really proceeds into br in case the processor predicts that br is likely to be taken. For example, suppose we first run P with x∈[128,255] several times and flush the cache after each run. Afterward, we run P again but setting x to 127. Still, the store instruction under the if branch (line 7) would be executed before P steers into the else branch due to the branch mis-prediction. More importantly, though the CPU performs a rollback to discard the update to v1, the cache side effect from writing v1 remains in C even after the remedy.
Going until line 9, array S and variable x map from line #1 to line #255 and v1 still occupies the #256 line. At this point there is no empty line available for v2. Following the LRU policy declared in section 2.1, executing the store instruction (line 9) would evict the oldest item S[0] from cache C and map v2 to the vacated line #1, as shown by the red dotted arrow in Figure 2 
Next, the program execution continues to line 10, reaching the last memory load of S[x]. The sensitive input x determines which array cell would be accessed. And we examine the cache behavior of this memory load w.r.t two cases x=0 and x!=0. Only if x=0 there is one more cache miss on path p 2 . This is an unique leak that enables attackers to learn the value of x due to a measurable timing variance. Note that the cold miss on speculatively writing v1 also causes an internal latency. However, it is un-observable to the external users and we ignore it safely for analysis purpose.
What SpecuSym Should Provide
The example shows that, though a program is carefully crafted to avoid cache timing leaks, running it under speculative execution may still exhibit new leaks. Since speculative execution is critical to modern processors, a systematic analysis for exposing the leaks would be of great importance. Specifically, we focus on two abilities for our Speculative Symbolic Execution tool SpecuSym . First, SpecuSym should be able to systematically explore possible program executions under speculative execution to find program paths and a minimum set of speculative flows that can cause potential timing leaks. E.g., both p 1 and p 2 and the corresponding speculations on the else and if branches, respectively. Second, SpecuSym should be able to pinpoint the leaky sites by cache analysis. It also requires to generate concrete inputs that witness new cache behavior at the identified memory visits. E.g., the memory store events to v2 and v1 and the value zero of x.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the preliminary knowledge of symbolic execution, cache timing leak, and speculative execution. Symbolic execution, a systematic program testing and analysis technique, was first introduced in the 1970s [20, 37] . In this work we assume that a program P consists of a finite set of instructions and P defines the execution semantics in the program paths. Let inst be an instruction then an event e:=(l b ≻ inst ≻ l a ) represents the interpretation of inst where l b and l a denote the program locations before and after inst, respectively. A program execution explores a program path by interpreting a sequence of events. Close to [29, 30] , we abstract e into three categories in terms of the type of the inst that e contains.
Symbolic Execution
• ψ -event, which presents a branch decision. It models the then branch by assume(c) and the else branch by assume(¬c), respectively. Term c is the representative of a conditional predicate expressed in symbolic expression. • χ -event, which corresponds to a memory read instruction of the form var = load addr, or a memory write instruction like store addr, expr where addr is the memory address and expr is a symbolic expression. • φ-event, which represents other types of instructions in the form var := expr. Here var is a variable and expr is a symbolic expression computed from preceding operations like arithmetic calculation, bit manipulation, and etc. Despite symbolic executors always support a rich set of instructions, we use the above types of events to abstract away the internal implementation details like memory allocation, function return, and etc., to focus on the high-level flow of symbolic execution. We present the baseline symbolic execution of a sensitive input related program in Algorithm 1. Unlike prior works [29, 30] , both global and local memory accesses are grouped into one uniform form. The data input, in := {λ, t }, determines a program execution consisting of ordered events {e 1 , . . . , e n } where λ is the sensitive input, e.g., privacy data or cipher keys, and t is the insensitive input.
The Stack is a global container for storing symbolic states during dynamic path exploration. A symbolic state s exhibits the frontier of a program execution. We define s as a tuple ⟨pc, e, brs, Ω⟩ where pc is the path condition that leads to s, e is the event to execute at s, brs contains the set of branch predicates if e is a ψ event, and Ω is the symbolic memory of s which maintains the mappings from the program variables to their runtime values at s.
Initially, the global container Stack is empty, and we start the recursive procedure BaseSymExec with the initial state s ini on input in which steers the execution to a random path. During the exploration, the procedure may perform a branch splitting (lines 4-8), a memory operation (lines 9-10), an internal computation (lines 11-12) or a state termination (line 14), depending on the event type.
Note that at the entry of each recursion, BaseSymExec takes a new symbolic state as the input, which is obtained from invoking a secondary procedure SubsequentState. This procedure accepts the current state s as the argument and outputs the new state s ′ from symbolically executing the inst of e at s. For brevity here we omit the details of the instruction interpretation.
Cache Timing Leak
Memory operations are prone to timing leaks because of the outstanding visiting latency between the cache and the main memory. For example, loading data from cache may cost 1-3 processor cycles whereas reading data from memory could consume hundreds of processor cycles. In this section, we first establish the threat model in our work, and then define the leak we are interested at based on the threat model. Figure 2 , the sensitive data involved in memory accesses is leaked from the traffic of a memory write. To reason this kind of leaks in our analysis method, we assume the attackers can perform strong external threats.
The Threat Model. As shown in
First, we assume the attackers share the same processor with the victim process. Hence they are able to learn the shared cache states by probe methods. Second, they are allowed to request the execution of the victim process. Third, they can observe the latency of the interested memory visits in the victim process. Our threat model is close to those used in practical attacks like [23, 48, 61] , where the attackers can deduce the cache line states by measuring the timing information of either the victim or the attacker process. Moreover, this model also appears in leak detection approaches like [11, 25, 55, 57] . Thereby, we believe it is a reasonable model for analysis purpose.
3.2.2
The Leak Definition. Formally, we can abstract a sensitive data related program P to be a function F P (in) ⇒ out who processes the data input in := {λ, t } (as defined in section 3.1) and computes the output out, e.g., assuming P is an encryption process, λ is the private key, t is the content for encryption, and out is the ciphertext, respectively. Let T (F P (in)) denotes the execution time of P with input in under non-speculative execution. Different inputs may explore many different execution paths. However, since we are only interested in leaks introduced by speculative execution, we assume the time of those non-speculative program execution remains similar or the same no matter what the sensitive inputs are, which is,
(1) Symbols λ and λ ′ denote any two sensitive values and t is still the public input. Nevertheless, since in practice attackers may gain information by observing several memory addresses or cache lines, we restrict the leak granularity to the memory event regarding our threat model. Specifically, let e be a memory event in P and the time of executing e with and without speculative execution be T s (P e (in)) and T (P e (in)), we assume:
Then the new cache timing leak of P under speculative execution can be checked by the following formula
where a leak appears if (1) two different sensitive inputs can cause significant timing differences on executing e under speculative execution; or (2) two sensitive inputs cause significant timing difference on executing e with and without speculative execution. In other words, P has a leak due to speculative execution if such pair of λ and λ ′ exists. Moreover, we transform formula (3) into a dedicated leak constraint and simplify the constraint to a more concise form in section 4. Also, as public input plays a minor role in modeling cache timing leaks [53] , we set t to a fixed value to reduce the reasoning cost of formula (3).
Speculative Execution
The instruction pipeline [51] in processor allows overlapped executions of proper instructions where each instruction execution has a series of stages. This instruction-level parallelism benefits hardware utilization since an instruction can start its stage prior to the time its preceding instructions have finished all their stages. However, a pipe-lined processor may get stalled once the program control flow needs to divert but the destination remains unknown (e.g., at a conditional branch). Accordingly, the pipeline has to await until the flow decision is computed.
To alleviate the cost of this control hazard, modern processors leverage branch prediction [45] and speculative execution [36] to reduce the delay that could incur w.r.t conditional branch instructions. Generally, they predict the execution flow upon the history of recently executed branches, and schedule instructions under predicted branches ahead of jumping into these branches. Specifically, on approaching a control hazard the processors first predict which branch to be taken. Then, they execute the selected branch and maintain the temporary path state in a dedicated buffer. Finally, they commit the buffered state to continue the program flow if the prediction is correct. Otherwise, upon an incorrect prediction, they have to discard the temporary state to revert the effects of the executed instructions hence avoiding functional errors.
This rollback mechanism, unfortunately, withdraws no affected cache state, which raises security risks. As shown in Figure 2 (b), variable v2 may map to cache line #256 due to speculative execution of the else branch. Moreover, this affect is not eliminated when control flow is redirected to the if branch because of the misprediction. As a result, sensitive data x leaks over the altered cache state. Abstracting away the hardware details, we can precisely model the behavior of speculative execution in symbolic execution as a three-step process and evaluate its side effects to the cache state with a constraint-solving based approach.
Misprediction Modeling. As aforementioned, on reaching a control hazard the processors predict the hazard result to select a branch. Despite the experience-based hardware realization, we can model this behavior by auxiliary symbolic state. To be specific, before diverging the control flow into the if branch, our symbolic executor would decide to duplicate a new state from the current , , symbolic state and schedule it immediately into the else direction, which represents the speculative execution of the else branch.
Speculative State Execution. Each duplicated state in misprediction modeling has the same memory snapshot to its parent symbolic state. For clarity, we use speculative state to name the new state. A speculative state will be prioritized to the head of the state queue in the symbolic executor, and executes uninterruptedly until it meets a predefined threshold, such as the maximum instruction number in the Reorder Buffer (ROB), the pipeline stage number, the branch depth, and etc. Owing to the copy-on-write schema in modern symbolic executors [14, 19] , the speculative state runs independently from their parent symbolic state. The memory updates in a speculative state won't taint its parent state who waits at the state-forking point for the speculative state returns. For the sake of cache analysis, we model the runtime cache state in each symbolic state. A speculative state inherits this data from its parent and keeps updating the cache during its execution.
Rollback and Cache Merging. Once a speculative state reaches the threshold, it has to stop and quit the state queue. Right before its termination, it notifies the awaiting parent state the finish of the current speculative execution, as well as transfers the cache status back to the parent. On receiving the notification, the parent symbolic state merges the speculated cache into its own cache to form the latest cache state. After that, the parent aborts waiting and resumes the normal execution. This step models the processor rollback mechanism in high fidelity and retains the changed cache state from speculative execution. Terminating the speculative state eliminates any further affects and the latest cache status has already been absorbed into the parent state. This approach is natural to symbolic execution, while the existing simulation [47] method requires sophisticated instrumentations and specific instructions to enforce CPU behaviors. More technical details will be presented in section 4.1.
SPECULATIVE SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
In this section we present the core algorithm of SpecuSym , and explain the technical contributions listed in Figure 1 . Algorithm 2 shows the main algorithm of SpecuSym , where the major changes from the baseline algorithm are at the state checkpoint (lines 3-5), the branch point (line 9), and the memory access point (lines [14] [15] . We highlight these changes in blue.
Speculative Modeling
On entering the SpecuSym procedure, our new algorithm first checks if the current state s is a speculative state, and whether s has reached the predefined threshold (line 3). If both conditions are met, SpecuSym stops the recursive symbolic execution on s and returns immediately (line 4). A state becomes a speculative state if it is duplicated from a regular symbolic state (line 22) by invoking SpeculativeExplore at a branch event (line 9).
Lines 19-28 in Algorithm 2 present the modeling procedure Spec-ulativeExplore. Generally, at a conditional branch (line 8), we call SpeculativeExplore (line 8) to start the speculative probe. That is, if the branch predicate relies on a memory access (line 21), e.g., using a static variable for the first time, we then duplicate a new state s ′ from state s (line 22) with a negated execution flow (line 23). This assumption is based on the observation that the memory visiting latency at a branch point may create a time window for speculative execution to load data into cache before the rollback. Otherwise, despite a branch misprediction, the CPU only spends several cycles on restoring before speculative execution takes effect on cache.
The new state s ′ becomes a speculative state afterwards, since it is about to mimic the speculative execution of the mis-predicted branch before resuming s. After state duplication, we let SpecuSym execute s ′ (line 24) and evaluate the effects of the memory visits in s ′ on the cache (line 15). Details of the evaluation will be presented in section 4.2. Once the recursive exploration of s ′ finishes, we use the accumulated cache state in s ′ to update that of s (line 25) and terminate s ′ (line 26). The termination ends the lifetime of state s ′ . It also assures that the execution in s ′ only attributes to the cache state changes but never affects the memory state of its parent state.
Next, when SpeculativeExplore returns, we resume the normal execution on s (line 10), with an updated cache state. In this way, we construct the speculative scenario and retain the latest cache. Our approach leverages the stateful feature of symbolic execution. It not only models the speculative behavior but also seamlessly stitches the cache state with controllable flexibility. Figure 3 shows the speculative modeling of the example P from Figure 2 . Figure 3 Then, in Figure 3(a) , on reaching the branch we duplicate a speculative state s ′ from s, and enforce a bounded execution (e.g., one memory access) into the else branch of s ′ , as shown by the red Figure 3 : The speculative execution modeling of P.
dashed line. Once s ′ meets the threshold, we stop the execution and turn back to its birth point where state s is awaiting the finish of s ′ . Also, we integrate the cache state of s ′ (cf. Figure 3(b) ) into s and terminate s ′ to resume s. Right now, the whole cache has been filled since the memory write in s ′ mapped v2 into the line #256 . Subsequently, the memory store to v1 in state s has to replace S[0] following the LRU policy, as shown in Figure 3(b) . Also, the last memory load to S[x] might result in a cache miss or a cache hit, depending on the value of x, which is consistent with the situation in section 2.3. Hence, our proposed method succeeds in modeling speculative execution and conforms to the three-step process designed in section 3.3. Note that Figure 3 (a) only shows the modeling of the else branch while SpecuSym considers both branches and misses no potential cases.
In this example, updating the cache state is straightforwardby checking the in-cache addresses to find an available cache line on a cache miss, or retain the current cache items in case of a hit. For the undecided address, i.e., S[x], we can try 255 possible cache mappings to test the difference. However, it is impractical to eagerly enumerate all potentials since it can cause unbearable overhead. Abstract interpretation based analysis [59] approximates concrete possibilities whereas this approach is impractical in symbolic execution. Also, many mappings are indeed redundant w.r.t leak exposure, e.g., only 1 mapping reveals leak in the motivating example.
Instead, SpecuSym models all possible branch mispredictions along with an execution path to maintain a stitched trace of memory events as the alternative of the cache state. Then it builds the leak constraint by analyzing the trace, and lazily searches for solutions. We detail this trace-based analysis in section 4.2 and section 4.3.
Cache State Modeling
This section explains how SpecuSym models the cache state. Since each explored path in symbolic execution represents a unique program run, we thereby extend the definition of a symbolic state s (cf. section 3.1) to be a new tuple ⟨pc, e, brs, Ω, ϖ⟩. The newly introduced symbol ϖ denotes the cache state on exploring s. Based on this design, we establish notions as following:
− A program state in SpecuSym is either a normal symbolic state or a speculative state, where from the former can the latter be duplicated, but not vice versa. − A stitched memory event trace, denoted as M = {m 0 , ..., m n }, consists of executed memory events in the execution order. − Each memory event m i in M, where index i ∈ [0, n], can be from a symbolic state or a speculativestate. − The cache state ϖ of a program state, is alternatively represented by M and the related computation. To be specific, after executing a memory event m i in a symbolic state, we analyze if m i may lead to timing leak under two scenarios, namely new divergent behavior and new opposite behavior. To formally explain these scenarios, we define the following notions.
− µ in (m i ) denotes the condition satisfying which m i can trigger a cache hit under speculative execution with input in. − a i denotes the accessed memory address in m i . − cs(a i ) denotes the cache set that a i maps to. − tag(a i ) denotes the unique tag of a i . − N denotes the cache associativity (i.e., N-way set associative cache, where N∈[1, the total number of cache lines]).
New Opposite
Behavior. It means executing m i under speculative execution causes a always-hit then the cache behavior in non-speculative execution must be a always-miss, and vice versa. Recall that we only target new leaks from speculative execution and this scenario depicts the exactly opposite leak behavior. To establish its definition, we introduce following new notions: 
Given a m i , we first search M for an identical address a j (a i =a j ) who was visited before m i . Also, a j has to be the nearest candidate that no other addresses between a j and a i are qualified (cf. 1 ). Second, we count the unique addresses that map to the same cache set to m i and assure the sum is less than the set associativity (cf. 2 ). Note that η in (m i ) is close to but not equivalent to µ in (m i ). E.g., for S[x] read in Figure 3 Given a m i , we first seek a preceding m j from M who might triggers a cache hit on executing m i . That is, their addresses a j and a i have the same tag and set (cf. 4 ). Moreover, we have to check the nearest m j because m i 's cache behavior directly relates to this m j . This is accomplished by ensuring non-existence of a a x between a j and a i who has the same tag and set values to a i (cf. 5 ).
Next, we consider the cache replacement policy. Without loss of generality, SpecuSym models a N-way set-associative cache with the LRU policy. Other policies can apply to equation (6) as well. Intuitively, on finding a potential m j for m i , the executed events between m j and m i should not evict m j from the cache, to promise a cache hit for m i . Under the LRU policy, we observe that iff satisfying property 1 can this non-evict requirement be met. Property 1. To avoid evicting the most recently used cache line from a cache set Set, the total number of subsequent unqiue cache mappings to Set must be less than the set associativity.
The sub-formula 6 checks whether an event m y between m j and m i can form a uniquely new mapping to the set that a i maps to. We perform the check by first comparing the set values of a y and a i . If this precondition satisfies, we check if address a y has never been accessed before by an event m z -by confirming that the tag value of a z always differs from that of a y . If this check also satisfies, then a y forms a uniquely new cache mapping. We count these new mappings to embed Property 1 in equation (6).
Take a 9-event trace M= {m 1 , m 2 , m 1 , m 3 , m 3 , m 4 , m 5 , m 4 , m 1 } as the example. For brevity we assume all the visited memory addresses associate with the same cache set and the set associativity is four. Also, each memory event corresponds to one cache line. And we want to check whether the last event, m 1 , can lead to a cache hit. Here we use #n to index each event where n ∈ [1, 9] .
Backtracking from the last m 1 , we first locate two preceding m 1 events, #1 and #3, as the candidates that satisfy 4 . Then, according to 5 , we select the nearest event #3, to form a sub-trace ρ as underlined in M. Note that after ρ's head event m 1 , the cache line used by m 1 becomes the most recently used line. We name this line as l. Then, following 6 , along ρ we can identify three uniquely new cache mappings to the same set, incurred by events #4 (m 3 ), #6 (m 4 ), and #7 (m 5 ), respectively. Other events, i.e., #5 (m 3 ) and #8 (m 4 ), cannot form unique mappings since they do not satisfy 6 .
Therefore, we conclude that the target event, m 1 , must lead to a cache hit because the identified three unique cache mappings at most evict other three lines rather than the most recently used line l. In other words, the number of uniquely new mappings is less than the cache set associativity, which conforms to Property 1.
Cache Behavior Analysis
In this section we leverage µ in (m i ), η in (m i ) and η ′ in (m i ) to analyze the cache behavior of m i . In general, if m i has no cache behavior variance in both speculative execution and non-speculative execution for any arbitrary inputs, then it leaks no data. Otherwise, at the program location of m i there is a leak.
Procedure AnalyzeCache in Algorithm 2 constructs the leak constraint. SpecuSym invokes AnalyzeCache right after executing a memory event (line 14). Inside the procedure, SpecuSym first examines whether the current state s is a symbolic state and the event s.e relates to sensitive input. This is because the timing affects inside the speculative execution is externally invisible and we only care about the sensitive data dependent memory accesses. Next, SpecuSym builds the leak constraint ξ for event s.e, and solves for solutions (lines [33] [34] [35] . If such inputs do not exist, SpecuSym claims leakage-free at s.e on the current program path.
To form ξ , we have to first build the constraint exposing new cache behaviors at a given memory event m i as follows.
Term div i represents the existence of New Divergent Behavior and term opp i checks New Opposite Behavior, respectively. We define ξ := div i ∨opp i as the leak constraint at m i . SpecuSym first computes η ′ in ′ (m i ) because of the lower cost of a must-be solving. Then, it uses the concretized value to substitute η ′ in ′ (m i ) in opp i for the solving of in. If such targeted in exists then opp i must be satisfiable and SpecuSym safely skips the solving of div i . Otherwise, it has to continue reasoning div i . Finally, if the solver successfully returns concrete solutions of ξ , SpecuSym generates a test case including the inputs, the trace M, and the event as the leak witness. It is worth noting that processors might mis-predict branches more than once along a program path. As a result, we need to count the cache side affects from multiple mispredictions. However, attackers always expect the minimum effort to trigger mispredictions for leak exposure. Meanwhile, manipulating multiple speculation windows would be of great difficulties for external attackers. In SpecuSym , we follow the adversary perspective to study whether one misprediction could be enough to cause timing leaks and leave the multiple speculation cases as our future work.
Optimizations
Speculative Assumption Checking. Recall that in Algorithm 2 we duplicate a new state s ′ from state s (line 22) if the branch predicate involves a memory visit rather than a cache visit. This assumption requires a heavy cache analysis whereas [59] overapproximately treats such access as memory visit. To balance the precision and efficiency, SpecuSym backwardly examines the memory accesses from last branch to the current branch. If the examination determines a cache hit, we know that speculative analysis at this point is unnecessary. Otherwise, we record this branch predicate and add the miss constraints to ξ for analysis.
Formula Simplification and Reduction. Formulas div i and opp i captures the complete set of cache behavioral differences. However, we observe that if η in (m i ) satisfies then µ in (m i ) must satisfy. Thereby we can further simplify ξ into ξ ′ as follows.
Since we assume a leakage-free program under non-speculative execution, η ′ in (m i ) must be 0 (miss) or 1 (miss). Meanwhile, if µ in (m i ) (the may-hit condition) has a different solution to η ′ in (m i ), then there must be a new cache behavior, either Divergent or Opposite. Thereby ξ ′ conforms to ξ . Also, since we repeatedly traverse memory access trace in constraint construction, caching the intermediate results helps avoid redundant computation. Therefore, we bank the computed address-comparing formulas into a hash map so that they can be quickly retrieved with tolerable storage overhead.
However, the size of equation (9) still increases quickly along with the increase of i, which pressures the constraint solver. By inspecting the formula structure, we seperate lengthy equations into smaller pieces with following strategies. First, if a sub-constraint of a conjunctive normal form (CNF) formula is determined as false, we directly return false. E.g., in equation (6), if 4 is false, we skip querying solver for 5 , and 6 . Second, if a sub-constraint in a disjunction normal form (DNF) formula is determined as true, we discard all other sub-constraints. As in equation (6), once we find the nearest a j by 5 , we discard sub-formulas for indices before j. Third, if two sub-formulas are in negated forms, we avoid a second solver query. E.g., in equation 6, constraint 5 of m j is the negation of constraint 4 of m j+1 , which implies we can save one constraint solving time.
EVALUATIONS
We have implemented SpecuSym based on the KLEE [14] symbolic executor and the LLVM compiler [40] . We refit KLEE in three main aspects. First, we made KLEE support bounded execution of the auxiliary speculative states and schedule the parent symbolic state afterwards, to mimic the mispredictions. Second, we made KLEE stitch a sequence of memory events from both regular symbolic state and speculative states, to represent the worst-case situation of speculative behaviors. Third, we made KLEE analyze the cache behaviors on memory events to generate concrete inputs for timing leaks. Based on these new components, we built SpecuSym for the cache timing leak analysis under speculative execution.
Specifically, after loading the LLVM bit-code of the target program, SpecuSym executes it symbolically, explores speculative states, stitches the memory events, and conducts cache analysis following Algorithm 2. Each leak constraint is encoded in Z3compatible form. On solving the leak constraint, SpecuSym outputs leak witness including the speculated event trace, the leaky memory visit, and concrete inputs.
We design the following research questions for the experiments:
• Can SpecuSym identify cache timing leaks introduced by speculative execution? • Can SpecuSym complement the fast abstract interpretation based method by providing more accurate results? • Can the optimizations effectively boost the overall performance? Table 1 shows the statistics of the benchmarks for evaluation. The first three columns, Name, LoC and Source indicate the names, the lines of code and the sources of these benchmarks. Column S-In denotes the sensitive input size in bytes. The last column Brs shows the number of conditional branches in each program. Our benchmark suite consists of a diverse set of open-source C programs. Specifically, the first program is from hpn-ssh [2] ; the second group has five programs from LibTomCrypt 1.18.1 [4] ; the third group uses two programs from glibc 2.29 [1]; the fourth group includes three programs from the Tegra library [7] ; the rest benchmarks are from the Libgcrypt 1. 8.4 [3] and the Spectre vulnerability application [6] . Most benchmarks are computation intensive despite the compact program sizes. The sensitive input of each benchmark is initialized to a symbolic array whose size is shown in column S-In. Also, each program has 1 to 133 conditional branches.
Benchmark Programs
We evaluate the benchmarks on the N-way set-associative cache and LRU policy with different cache settings. To be specific, we design four caches as (1) 32KB cache size with N=4; (2) 32KB cache size with N=8; (3) 64KB cache size with N=8; and (4) 32KB cache size with N=512. Each cache line has 64 bytes among all caches. The first three settings are close to the L1 data cache types in modern processors like [8, 9] . The last setting forms a fully-associative cache on which we compare SpecuSym with [59] . Besides, we evaluate the effectiveness of optimizations using the third setting. All the evaluations are conducted on a machine running Ubuntu 16.04 64bit Server Linux with Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.20GHz CPUs 24 cores and 256GB RAM. Each benchmark is set to run at most 12 hours.
Experimental Results

Timing Leak Detection.
We first design experiments for the research question (1). Table 2 shows the leak detection results under aforementioned three set-associative cache settings. Let's name them as C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 . C 1 has 32KB size and each cache set consists of 4 lines. As each line has 64 bytes, C 1 has 128 sets in total. C 2 also owns 32KB size but its cache associativity increases to 8. Hence it has 64 sets. C 3 has 64KB size while its associativity remains 8, thereby it has 128 sets and 1024 cache lines. For each program, we collect execution statistics under different cache settings, including , , [7] 0.13 0/0 0.12 0/0 0.13 0/0 Salsa [7] 0.03 0/0 0.03 0/0 0.04 0/0 Seed [7] 0 Next, we compare the results of C 1 and C 2 , to research how the cache associativity could affect the leak occurrence. Intuitively, the more lines per cache set, the less potential cache conflicts hence less leaks. However, experiments show that the increased associativity indeed triggers more leaks. First, SpecuSym detected 60 and 130 leaks under C 1 and C 2 , respectively. Second, 5 out of the 6 leaky programs have more leaks under C 2 . The only exception, encoder, has 5 leaks in both C 1 and C 2 . Third, the non-leaky program under C 1 , blowfish, now turns to reveal 2 new leaks under C 2 . This phenomenon is because the speculative memory visits raise more cache hits -the cache misses under non-speculative execution now have higher possibilities to be hits as memory data has been loaded into cache sets earlier from speculative execution.
Moreover, we compare between C 2 and C 3 , to research how the cache size could affect leak detection. We find that despite the different cache sizes, the detection results show no drastic variances. First, SpecuSym detected exactly the same types and amounts of leaks in 3 programs (chacha20, encoder, and DES [5]) in both C 2 and C 3 . The analysis costs are also close. Second, another two leaky programs, AES and DES [1], also show similar statistics. Third, the major difference comes from blowfish, which has two leaks on C 2 but no leaks on C 3 . Though this unique case indicates smaller cache might incur more leaks, it is not the majority situation.
We also observe drastically diverse results from different versions of the same algorithm. E.g., in three DES implementations from OpenSSL around 6.5 hours on C 2 and C 3 . By constrast, the Libgcrypt DES costs merely 1 minute in all experiments. Therefore, we can answer the first research question: SpecuSym is able to detect timing leaks introduced by speculative execution. It also supports various caches for the effective leak detection.
Existing Method Comparison.
We compare SpecuSym with the latest work [59] in Table 3 , to answer the the second research question. Column 1 lists all the benchmarks used in [59] for timing leak evaluation. Columns 2-3 show the detection result and the computation time of the abstract interpretation based method [59] . Columns 4-6 depict the result of SpecuSym while column 5 lists the total amount of detected leaks. We set up the same cache setting used in [59] (512-line fully-associative cache with LRU policy) to assure a fair comparison. Let's name it as C 4 .
Overall, [59] analyzed that 5 of the 10 benchmarks are leaky, as marked with ✔ in column 2. Consequently, the rest 5 programs are free of timing leaks. For these non-leaky programs, SpecuSym also detects no leaks, as shown in column 4. This means SpecuSym does not introduce false positives on validating these robust programs. In contrast, for those ✔ results from [59] , SpecuSym has different results on two benchmarks, hash and ocb, as underlined in Table 3 . They are deemed to be leaky in [59] while SpecuSym found no leaks in them. We manually inspect the two benchmarks and confirm that SpecuSym gives the right answer -no leaks exist in the two programs. The inaccurate results of [59] might root from its overapproximation nature and they are indeed false positives.
For the remaining programs chacha20, encoder, and DES, both SpecuSym and [59] have detected leaks. However, [59] only claims the leaky situation while SpecuSym generates richer information. E.g., SpecuSym pingpoints 9, 5, and 8 leaky memory operations in these benchmarks, respectively. Moreover, SpecuSym is able to provide inputs and the speculative traces for leak diagnosis. Note that SpecuSym performs generally faster on C 4 than on set-associative caches C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 since the extreme cache setting of C 4 promotes cache utilization and cache hit rate in these benchmarks.
One drawback of SpecuSym is the computation cost. In generates precise inputs. Moreover, if [59] could provide assisting information, e.g., the suspicious locations on the control flow graph, SpecuSym could dedicate its analysis on the problematic areas.
Therefore, we answer the second research question: SpecuSym can complement the fast abstract interpretation based analysis [59] on false positive elimination and concrete leak witness generation.
Optimization Performance.
We study the performance of our optimization strategies (cf. Section 4.4) in this section. As shown in Table 4 , after optimization (Optimized), the overall execution time (Time) decreases to 30.75% of the non-optimization situation (Base), which demonstrates the effectiveness of optimization.
Apart from time cost, our optimization reduces constraint size by more than 20% to ease the solver cost. Moreover, we find that the Base setting missed almost 2/3 (44) leaks within the time bound (12 hours) . This highlights the necessity of optimization because it helps detect as many leaks as possible under limited resources. In Figure 4 , we examine the impact of optimization on each benchmark in terms of both time cost and constraint size. In the figure, we present each case using their orders in table 1.
Clearly in Figure 4 (a) that optimization largely decreases time cost for 6 out of 15 cases from hundreds of minutes to less than one hour. On the one hand, this is because the Base situation involves a great many redundant computation while the intermediate results cached in optimization can be re-used. On the other hand, the size of constraint is reduced through formula simplification which lowers the cost of solving. We show the detail in Figure 4 (b) that optimization reduces constraint size, especially for AES [4] , glibc DES [1], and seed [7] .
For the remaining cases, the length of execution trace is typically short which means the number of memory access to analyze is limited. Thus, our optimization does not differ much from the base computation.
Threat to Validity
Our approach considers nested speculative execution because branch instruction may also exist in speculative states. Since the time window of speculative execution is typically short, we implement the nest depth as configurable and set it to 2 in evaluation. Though speculative execution may end at arbitrary points, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our under-approximation in the experiments.
Another threat is from the impact of out-of-order execution. Out-of-order execution also reschedules memory accesses, which may affect the accuracy our analysis. However, considering both speculative execution and out-of-order execution is challenging. We leave it as our future work.
We do not consider the speculative execution that leverages Branch Target Buffer (BTB) or Return Stack Buffer (RSB) to select the destinations of indirect branches. Such vulnerabilities have been effectively mitigated by Intel and AMD through Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) settings.
SpecuSym analyzes LLVM IR to detect leaks caused by speculative execution. However, the program runtime behavior can be different due to back-end compiler optimization and address space layout randomization (ASLR). Although we have simulated the execution environment, more low-level details of benchmarks can further facilitate us to improve analysis results.
RELATED WORK
Regarding the security impact of processor speculative execution [36] , Kocher et al. [38] demonstrated that speculative execution influences the cache state and leads to cache timing attacks, which motivates the design of SpecuSym .
To estimate cache side channels, Doychev et al. [24] approximate cache states through concrete state abstraction. Despite the upper bound of information leakage, the estimation offers few guidance on fixing the problems. Doychev et al. [25] also shows that compiler optimization can remove side channels. However, it is undesirable for critical libraries to make the security guarantee be compilerdependent.
Symbolic execution [37] has been applying to cache analysis because of its precise reasoning and input generation natures. To quantify the information leakage through cache side channel, Chattopadhyay et al. [15, 16] and Basu et al. [10] developed symbolic execution methods to study dependencies between sensitive data and cache behaviors. Wang et al. developed CacheD [55] which aims at timing leaks through a trace-based symbolic execution. Furthermore, Brotzman et al. [11] proposed CaSym, a symbolic reasoning method which supports cache analysis over multiple program paths. Considering the cache affects from thread interleavings, Guo et al. [30] proposed SymSC to analyze cache timing leaks due to multithreading. These methods, however, are all unaware of cache state changes under speculative execution.
Abstract interpretation [21] has also been adopting to cache reasoning in terms of its scalable analysis and sound approximation. CacheS [54] proposes a secret-augmented abstract domain to track program secrets and dependencies. It treats public data in a coarsegrained fashion and secret data in a finer-grained manner to balance the scalability and precision. However, CacheS is also unaware of the impact from speculative execution on cache state. Though Wu et.al [59] developed a dedicated abstract interpretation method for worst case exectuion estimation and cache timing leak analysis , , under speculative execution, they are unable to generate precise inputs to diagnose the leaks in depth.
Likewise, grey-box fuzz testing has been used in detecting Spectretype [38] program vulnerabilities [47] , exposing side channels [46] , and revealing timing leaks [31] . However, these methods are either unaware of speculative exectution [31, 46] or relying on costful instrumentations on control flow graph. Also, due to the testing nature, these methods heavily count on the fuzz heuristics wheres SpecuSym systematically solves for precise inputs.
To conclude, existing program analysis approaches either fail to generate inputs or ignore cache affects from speculative execution. To fill the gap, SpecuSym models speculative execution through stateful symbolic execution so as to produce inputs that endorse the leaks.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a symbolic execution based method SpecuSym for detecting cache timing leaks on running a sensitive data related program under speculative execution. SpecuSym systematically explores the program paths and models speculative execution at conditional branches. By cache state modeling as well as cache behavior analysis, SpecuSym uses SMT-solving to search for divergent and opposite cache behaviors at memory access events. Experimental results show that SpecuSym can detect timing leaks under various cache settings. Comparison between SpecuSym and state-of-the-art abstract interpretation based leak detection method shows SpecuSym not only successfully eliminates false positives but also generates precise inputs for leak exposure.
